Wisconsin Recording Laws (2026): Wis. Stat. § 968.31 Guide

Wisconsin is a one-party consent state under Wis. Stat. § 968.31(2)(c): any participant in a wire, electronic, or oral communication may record without notifying other parties, unless the recording serves a criminal, tortious, or otherwise injurious purpose. Recording without any party's consent is a Class H felony.
Wisconsin is a one-party consent state. Under Wis. Stat. § 968.31(2)(c), a private actor who is a party to the conversation, or who has the prior consent of one party, may lawfully record a wire, electronic, or oral communication without violating the criminal prohibition at Wis. Stat. § 968.31(1). The statute carves the participant exception directly out of the offense, so the criminal rule only reaches recordings where no party to the communication consents and the recorder is acting outside the (2)(b) color-of-law exception or the (2)(c) private-party exception. (c1, c2)
Recording without any party's consent is a Class H felony in Wisconsin under Wis. Stat. § 968.31(1): up to 6 years in prison and up to a $10,000 fine under Wis. Stat. § 939.50(3)(h). Civil damages under Wis. Stat. § 968.31(2m) are actual damages with a liquidated-damages floor of $100 per day of violation or $1,000 minimum (whichever is higher), plus punitive damages and reasonable attorney's fees and litigation costs. (c3, c4)
Wisconsin's defining statutory quirk is the broader-than-federal tortious-purpose limitation in § 968.31(2)(c). The participant safe harbor disappears if the recording is made "for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the constitution or laws of the United States or of any state or for the purpose of committing any other injurious act." The phrase "any other injurious act" goes further than the federal ECPA equivalent at 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) and means recording to extort, blackmail, harass, stalk, defame, or accomplish another wrong forfeits the participant exception even if the recorder is a party to the call. (c1, r1)
This page is the Wisconsin recording-law hub on RecordingLaw.com. It walks through the statutory architecture (definitions at § 968.27, criminal prohibition and exceptions at § 968.31, civil cause at § 968.31(2m)), the leading Wisconsin Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit authority, criminal and civil penalties, federal overlays, workplace and police-recording rules, the deepfake and election synthetic-media statutes, and the body-camera and admissibility frameworks. For state-by-state context, see the full list of one-party consent states and the counter-list of all-party consent states.
Is Wisconsin a one-party or two-party consent state?
Wisconsin is a one-party consent state. Under Wis. Stat. § 968.31(2)(c), a single party's consent satisfies the statute. If you are part of the conversation, you may record it without telling the other person. The criminal prohibition at § 968.31(1) only reaches recordings where no party to the communication consents (and where neither the (2)(b) color-of-law exception nor the (2)(c) private-party exception applies). (c1, c2, c3)
Wisconsin's Electronic Surveillance Control Law (WESCL), codified at Wis. Stat. §§ 968.27 to 968.37, mirrors the federal one-party-consent floor at 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) on the basic rule. A private participant in a Wisconsin conversation does not need anyone else's permission to record. The WESCL adds two important guardrails on top of the basic rule. (r1)
The first guardrail is the tortious-purpose exception at § 968.31(2)(c). The participant safe harbor evaporates if the recording is made for "any criminal or tortious act" or for "any other injurious act." The "any other injurious act" language is broader than the federal ECPA exception. A recording made to extort the other speaker, to harass or stalk them, to set up a defamation claim, or to commit another wrong is not within the participant exception even if the recorder is a party to the call. (c1)
The second guardrail is scope. Wisconsin's WESCL covers in-person "oral communication" uttered with a reasonable expectation of privacy under Wis. Stat. § 968.27. Face-to-face recording IS within the wiretap chapter when there is such an expectation. This distinguishes Wisconsin from neighboring Indiana, whose wiretap chapter excludes purely in-person oral communication. A Wisconsin participant recording an in-person conversation in a private place still has to satisfy the (2)(c) participant exception. (c5)
Practical answer: if you are a participant in a Wisconsin conversation (phone, video call, or in-person with a reasonable expectation of privacy) and your purpose is not criminal, tortious, or otherwise injurious, you may record without telling the other party. Wisconsin is NOT a two-party (all-party) consent state. Searches like "is Wisconsin a two-party consent state" return No: only one party (which can be you) needs to consent.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has applied this framework twice in major cases: State v. Duchow, 2008 WI 57 (parent-on-behalf-of-child consent in a school-bus recording prosecution) and State v. House, 2007 WI 79 (totality-of-the-circumstances test for evaluating consent voluntariness in a color-of-law setting). Both are addressed in detail below. (c10, c11)

Wisconsin's wiretap statute: Wis. Stat. § 968.31 explained
Wisconsin's WESCL is built around four operative subsections of § 968.31:
- § 968.31(1) is the criminal prohibition. Class H felony to intentionally intercept (or attempt) any wire, electronic, or oral communication; to use a device to intercept oral communication; or to disclose or use intercepted contents knowing the source was an unlawful interception.
- § 968.31(2)(b) is the color-of-law one-party exception for officers, cooperating witnesses, and other color-of-law actors who are participants or have one party's consent.
- § 968.31(2)(c) is the private one-party exception for participants and one-party-consenting recorders, UNLESS the recording is made for any criminal, tortious, or other injurious purpose.
- § 968.31(2m) is the civil cause of action for actual damages with a $100/day or $1,000 minimum floor (whichever higher), plus punitive damages and reasonable attorney's fees and litigation costs.
The textual basis for one-party consent is the (2)(c) private-party exception, quoted in full: "It is not unlawful under ss. 968.28 to 968.37 for a person not acting under color of law to intercept a wire, electronic or oral communication where the person is a party to the communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to the interception unless the communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the constitution or laws of the United States or of any state or for the purpose of committing any other injurious act." (c1)
The "any other injurious act" clause is Wisconsin's defining quirk. Federal ECPA at 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) cuts off the participant exception only for "criminal or tortious" purposes. Wisconsin adds a third trigger with no federal analog. Wisconsin participant recorders thus bear a slightly heavier risk: a recording that would survive federal scrutiny may still forfeit the Wisconsin exception if the purpose can be characterized as "injurious" even when neither criminal nor tortious. (c1, r1)
The criminal prohibition reaches three categories of communication defined in § 968.27: wire (aural transfer through wire/cable facilities), electronic (transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence by wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic, or photoelectric system), and oral communication (uttered with a reasonable expectation of privacy). The oral category sweeps in face-to-face speech, so Wisconsin's WESCL is broader in scope than wiretap chapters (like Indiana's) that limit their statute to transmitted communications. (c5)
The color-of-law exception at § 968.31(2)(b) does not carry an explicit "criminal, tortious, or injurious" carve-out (the exception itself is conditioned on color-of-law authority). The State v. House totality-of-the-circumstances test for consent voluntariness applies here. (c11)
The civil cause of action at § 968.31(2m) is independent of any criminal prosecution. The damages floor (the greater of $100/day or $1,000) is liquidated, meaning the plaintiff need not prove specific economic harm to recover at least the floor. Punitive damages and reasonable attorney's fees and litigation costs are also recoverable. A narrow good-faith reliance defense at § 968.31(3) constitutes a complete defense to any civil or criminal action where the defendant relied on a court order or on the warrantless-disclosure provisions of the chapter. (c4)

Penalties for illegal recording in Wisconsin
| Offense | Statute | Felony Class | Maximum Prison | Maximum Fine |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Unlawful interception of wire, electronic, or oral communication | § 968.31(1)(a) | Class H felony | 6 years | $10,000 |
| Unlawful disclosure of intercepted contents | § 968.31(1)(c) | Class H felony | 6 years | $10,000 |
| Unlawful use of intercepted contents | § 968.31(1)(d) | Class H felony | 6 years | $10,000 |
| Surveillance device in a private place; peeping at public-accommodation changing rooms or toilets for sexual gratification | § 942.08(2) | Class A misdemeanor | 9 months | $10,000 |
| Up-the-clothing or down-the-blouse capture for sexual gratification | § 942.08(3) | Class I felony | 3 years 6 months | $10,000 |
| § 942.08(2) violation enhanced when victim under 18 | § 942.08(4) | Class I felony | 3 years 6 months | $10,000 |
| Drone-based observation of person with reasonable expectation of privacy | § 942.10 | Class A misdemeanor | 9 months | $10,000 |
| Posting, distributing, or exhibiting a synthetic intimate representation with intent to coerce, harass, or intimidate | § 942.09(2)(am)4 | Class I felony | 3 years 6 months | $10,000 |
The WESCL interception offense is a Class H felony, the third-lowest of Wisconsin's nine felony classes (A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I). Wis. Stat. § 939.50(3)(h) sets the Class H maximum at 6 years' imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. The indeterminate Wisconsin sentencing structure at § 973.01 typically splits the term into an initial confinement period and an extended supervision period, with the court setting both within statutory caps. (c3, c7)
The Class H classification is important because a related family of offenses (Wisconsin's voyeurism, intimate-image, and deepfake provisions at §§ 942.08, 942.09, and 942.10) sits at Class I felony or Class A misdemeanor for the base offenses. Class I caps at 3 years 6 months' imprisonment and a $10,000 fine; Class A misdemeanor caps at 9 months' jail and a $10,000 fine. Do not confuse the WESCL Class H interception offense with the Class I synthetic-intimate-representation posting offense. They are different statute families with different sentencing tiers. (c8, c9)
Civil liability under § 968.31(2m) parallels the federal ECPA structure at 18 U.S.C. § 2520 with one notable difference: Wisconsin's liquidated-damages floor is the greater of actual damages, $100 per day of violation, or $1,000 (the federal floor under 18 U.S.C. § 2520(c)(2) is the greater of actual damages, $100/day, or $10,000, which is ten times Wisconsin's minimum). A Wisconsin plaintiff who proves a single instance of illegal interception is entitled to at least $1,000 in liquidated damages without separately proving economic harm. Punitive damages are available for willful or egregious violations, and reasonable attorney's fees and litigation costs are recoverable in addition. (c4)
The good-faith reliance defense at § 968.31(3) is narrow. It applies where the defendant relied on a Wisconsin court order, a federal court order, or one of the warrantless-disclosure provisions in the chapter. A defendant cannot escape civil liability by arguing they thought the recording was legal or that they were unaware of the chapter's reach. Reliance on the participant exception is a substantive merits defense, not a good-faith defense.
A felony conviction under § 968.31(1) carries the long-term collateral consequences that attach to any Wisconsin felony: a permanent criminal record, potential loss of firearm rights under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), restrictions on professional licensing, and difficulties in employment, housing, and education. Restoration of rights typically requires a pardon under Wisconsin's executive-clemency framework, since Wisconsin does not provide for general expungement of adult felony convictions.

Recording in-person conversations in Wisconsin
Wisconsin's WESCL covers in-person oral communication when uttered with a reasonable expectation of privacy under Wis. Stat. § 968.27. Face-to-face recording IS within the wiretap chapter when there is such an expectation. This is a critical scope point that Wisconsin shares with the federal ECPA but that distinguishes Wisconsin from Indiana's transmitted-only wiretap chapter. (c5)
The statutory definition of "oral communication" under § 968.27 is borrowed almost verbatim from the federal ECPA at 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2): "oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that the communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying the expectation." The test has subjective and objective components: the speaker must actually expect privacy, and the circumstances must justify that expectation.
Where the expectation is justified: a private home, an enclosed office with the door closed, a private vehicle, a hotel room, a private medical examination room, a private legal conference room, or any other place reasonably understood to be out of public earshot.
Where the expectation is NOT justified: public sidewalks, parks, government buildings open to the public, public transit, an open restaurant dining area, a hotel lobby, or anywhere bystanders can reasonably be expected to overhear. Recording these conversations is outside the WESCL because there is no covered "oral communication."
The participant exception at § 968.31(2)(c) governs in-person recording even when the WESCL applies. If you are a party to a conversation in a private place, you may record without telling the other party, subject to the criminal-tortious-injurious purpose limit. The Wisconsin Supreme Court applied this framework in State v. Duchow, 2008 WI 57: a recording made by a school-bus driver of a special-needs student's conversation, captured pursuant to the parents' consent on behalf of their child, was a lawful one-party-consent interception under § 968.31(2)(c). The Court held the parents had an objectively reasonable basis to be concerned for their child's safety, and participant-consent recording is not unlawful under the WESCL even when it captures a non-consenting third party. (c10)
Practical advice: confirm you are a participant in the conversation; do not plant a device and leave the room (the participant exception requires you to be a party); for sensitive recordings, consider express consent to avoid disputes about expectation of privacy or your purpose; keep an unaltered original to support authentication. For visual surveillance in private places, see the Hidden cameras and video section below: that conduct is governed by the voyeurism statute at § 942.08 and (for AI-generated intimate imagery) by § 942.09 as expanded by 2025 Wisconsin Act 34, not by the WESCL. (c8, c9)

Recording phone calls and electronic communications
Phone calls, video calls, and other transmitted communications fall within the WESCL "wire communication" and "electronic communication" categories under § 968.27. Wisconsin's one-party rule under § 968.31(2)(c) authorizes any participant to record, subject to the tortious-purpose limit. The rule covers landline calls, cellular calls, VoIP calls, video conferencing platforms (Zoom, Teams, Google Meet, Webex, FaceTime), and voice/video messaging features (WhatsApp, Signal, iMessage voice notes); the "electronic communication" definition is technology-neutral and reaches platforms that postdate the statute. (c1, c5)
Multistate calls. If any party is in an all-party state (California, Connecticut for in-person, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Washington, or another strict-state jurisdiction), the stricter state's law typically governs. A Wisconsin caller dialing an Illinois number assumes Illinois Eavesdropping Act risk (720 ILCS 5/14-2). Conservative practice for cross-border calls: announce the recording at the start, or get express consent.
Business call recording. A Wisconsin business is a participant in its own customer-service or sales calls and may record under § 968.31(2)(c). Federal TCPA rules at 47 C.F.R. Part 64 govern marketing and robocall conduct but do not impose a separate two-party-consent rule for ordinary business calls. (47 C.F.R. § 64.501, the old beep-tone rule, was REMOVED effective November 20, 2017; do not cite it as live.) Multistate operators should still provide a recorded notice at the start of every call to comply with the strictest applicable state. (r6, r7)
FCC AI-voice rule. The FCC's February 2024 Declaratory Ruling 24-17 classifies AI-generated voices in robocalls as "artificial or prerecorded voice" under the TCPA, requiring prior express written consent for AI-voice marketing calls to wireless numbers and residential lines. Wisconsin's anti-robocall statute at Wis. Stat. § 100.52 layers additional state restrictions; the FCC ruling does not preempt more protective state law. (r4)
FCC 24-24 One-to-One Consent Rule (vacated). Vacated by the Eleventh Circuit in Insurance Marketing Coalition Ltd. v. FCC, mandate April 30, 2025. The pre-existing TCPA prior-express-written-consent regime under 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(2)-(3) governs marketing robocalls and texts. Always note the vacatur. (r5)
For broader treatment, see our phone calls overlay and the federal one-party-consent floor.

The tortious-purpose exception: when one-party consent disappears
Wisconsin's defining quirk is the language at § 968.31(2)(c) cutting off the participant exception when the recording is made for "any criminal or tortious act in violation of the constitution or laws of the United States or of any state OR FOR THE PURPOSE OF COMMITTING ANY OTHER INJURIOUS ACT." The "any other injurious act" phrase is broader than the federal ECPA equivalent at 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d), which uses only "criminal or tortious." The legislature deliberately chose to broaden the federal floor; the safe harbor falls away whenever the recorder's purpose can be characterized as wrongful toward the recorded party. (c1)
Purposes that forfeit the participant exception:
- Extortion and blackmail. Recording to threaten the speaker with disclosure unless they pay or perform is a textbook tortious purpose, plus a probable Wisconsin extortion offense under Wis. Stat. § 943.30.
- Harassment and stalking. Recording to track, threaten, or coerce a former intimate partner (or to set up a Wisconsin stalking offense under § 940.32) forfeits the exception under both the criminal-purpose leg and the "any other injurious act" leg.
- Defamation setup. Recording primarily to publish a selectively edited or contextualized clip for the purpose of defaming the speaker can fall within the tortious-purpose leg.
- Doxxing or fraud facilitation. Capturing a speaker's voice or private information for hostile public disclosure or for synthetic-voice fraud or deepfake fabrication forfeits the exception.
Purposes that DO NOT forfeit the exception:
- Documenting the speaker's harassment, abuse, or workplace misconduct (the recorder is the victim).
- Recording for journalistic or accountability purposes (including recording on-duty police, see below).
- Recording your own meeting, medical visit, or legal consultation for personal memory or notes.
- Capturing a conversation as evidence in a legal proceeding (preserving verbal-contract terms, for example).
The line is the recorder's purpose at the time of recording, not the eventual use. A recording made for legitimate documentation that incidentally embarrasses the speaker is still within the exception; a recording made specifically to harm the speaker is outside it. The Wisconsin Supreme Court applied the (2)(c) framework in State v. Duchow: the parents' consent on behalf of their child was held lawful because the parents had an "objectively reasonable basis" to be concerned for the child's safety, and the participant-consent recording was lawful even though it captured a non-consenting third party. (c10)

Hidden cameras and video: Wis. Stat. § 942.08 and § 942.09
Wisconsin's privacy-of-image statutes are layered on top of the WESCL audio-recording chapter. The two layers are separate: a single act of surreptitious recording can violate both § 968.31 (if it captures audio of a private oral communication) and § 942.08 (if the device is a video surveillance device installed in a private place).
Wis. Stat. § 942.08 (invasion of privacy / voyeurism). Subsection (2) reaches three categories of conduct, each a Class A misdemeanor (up to 9 months' jail and a $10,000 fine):
- Knowingly installing a surveillance device in any private place, or using a surveillance device that has been installed in a private place, with the intent to observe any nude or partially nude person without the consent of the person observed.
- For the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification, looking into an enclosed area of a public accommodation that is intended to be used by a member of the public for the purpose of changing clothes or using a toilet.
- Entering another person's property without that person's consent and viewing the residence from a place not open to the general public.
Subsection (3) reaches up-the-clothing or down-the-blouse capture for sexual gratification (Class I felony, up to 3 years 6 months' prison and a $10,000 fine). Subsection (4) enhances any subsection (2) violation to a Class I felony when the victim is under 18. The voyeurism statute is a separate statute family from the WESCL: even where there is no covered "oral communication," surreptitious imaging in a private place can independently violate § 942.08. (c8)
Wis. Stat. § 942.09 (representations depicting nudity), as expanded by 2025 Wisconsin Act 34. Section 942.09 reaches non-consensual capture, possession, and distribution of intimate representations:
- § 942.09(2) makes it a Class I felony to capture a representation that depicts nudity without the knowledge and consent of the person depicted, where the person has a reasonable expectation of privacy.
- § 942.09(3m) makes it a Class A misdemeanor to post or publish a private representation of an adult without consent, with a Class H felony enhancement when the victim is under 18.
- § 942.09(1)(e), added by 2025 Wisconsin Act 34, defines "synthetic intimate representation" as a representation generated using technological means that uses an identifiable person's face, likeness, or other distinguishing characteristic to depict an intimate representation of that person, regardless of whether the representation includes components that are artificial, legally generated, or generally accessible, and that is so realistic that a reasonable person would believe it depicts conduct of the identifiable person.
- § 942.09(2)(am)4, added by 2025 Wisconsin Act 34, makes it a Class I felony to post, publish, distribute, or exhibit a synthetic intimate representation of an identifiable person with intent to coerce, harass, or intimidate. (c9, c12)
The Act 34 expansion is addressed in detail in the deepfake and AI section below. The key statutory placement to remember: synthetic intimate representation is § 942.09, NOT § 942.08. § 942.08 is a separate voyeurism / surveillance-device statute family.
Wis. Stat. § 942.10 (drone surveillance). Wisconsin's drone-surveillance statute makes it a Class A misdemeanor (up to 9 months' jail, $10,000 fine) to use a drone, as defined in § 175.55(1)(a), with the intent to photograph, record, or otherwise observe another individual in a place or location where the individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy. Law enforcement officers operating under § 175.55(2) authorization are exempt. § 942.10 is the drone-surveillance statute, not "interception by photo." Earlier baseline framings that called § 942.10 "interception by photo" were wrong; the statute reaches drone-based observation in places with a justified privacy expectation. (c13)
For the broader cross-jurisdictional treatment of hidden cameras and consumer-grade recording devices, see our Wisconsin surveillance camera laws spoke and the [Is it illegal to video record someone without their consent?](/is-it-illegal-to-video-record-someone-without-their-consent/) overview.
FTC v. Ring (2023). The FTC's enforcement settlement with Ring, United States v. Ring LLC, No. 1:23-cv-01549 (D.D.C. May 31, 2023), required a $5.8 million consumer redress payment and a comprehensive privacy and security program after findings that Ring had given employees and contractors broad access to customer video without adequate consent or safeguards. Wisconsin consumers using Ring or other smart-home cameras with audio capture should remember that audio-capable smart cameras inside a Wisconsin home recording guests or service workers may trigger WESCL exposure under § 968.31 where no party to the conversation consents. (r10)

Recording the police in Wisconsin (7th Circuit ACLU v. Alvarez)
Wisconsin sits in the Seventh Circuit (with Illinois and Indiana). The controlling First Amendment authority on recording on-duty police officers is ACLU of Illinois v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012). The Seventh Circuit ordered a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the Illinois Eavesdropping Act as applied to the ACLU's planned program of openly recording on-duty police officers in public, holding that "the act of making an audio or audiovisual recording is necessarily included within the First Amendment's guarantee of speech and press rights" and that criminalizing all nonconsensual audio recording is not narrowly tailored to the state's interest in conversational privacy. (c14)
Alvarez remains binding precedent in Wisconsin federal courts (Eastern and Western Districts of Wisconsin) as of 2026. Wisconsin has NO state Right-to-Record statute. Combined with the participant-consent rule at § 968.31(2)(c), a citizen openly recording on-duty police in a public place is doubly protected: the citizen is a participant in their own observational recording, and the First Amendment protects the act of recording. (c1, c14)
What you can do: film traffic stops (including your own), record public arrests, document interactions with officers performing their duties, livestream encounters, and photograph or video-record officers from a reasonable distance on public property.
What you cannot do: interfere with police operations, trespass to get a better angle, physically obstruct an officer's movement, refuse a lawful safety instruction, or record covertly from inside a place with a justified expectation of privacy in a manner that triggers § 968.31 or § 942.08 (the Alvarez shield is for public recording of public duties).
A Wisconsin officer who orders you to stop recording solely because you are recording is exceeding their authority; an officer issuing lawful time/place/manner orders (step back, clear a scene, leave private property where you are not invited) should be obeyed on the spot, with the order challengeable afterward if pretextual. For broader treatment, see our recording police overview.

Workplace recording and NLRB Section 7
Wisconsin's one-party-consent rule governs the criminal-law analysis of workplace recording. As a participant in a Wisconsin workplace conversation, you may record your boss, HR representative, or coworkers without telling them, subject to the tortious-purpose limit at § 968.31(2)(c). But criminal-law lawfulness is not employment-law immunity: Wisconsin is an at-will employment state, and a private-sector employer may discipline or fire an employee for recording in violation of a valid no-recording policy. (c1)
NLRB Stericycle, Inc. (2023). Stericycle, Inc., 372 NLRB No. 113 (Aug. 2, 2023) set the test for workplace rules under Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA. A no-recording rule is presumptively unlawful under Section 7 if a reasonable economically dependent employee could interpret it to chill protected concerted activity. The employer may rebut by proving the rule advances a legitimate and substantial business interest that cannot be served by a more narrowly tailored rule. Stericycle applies to Wisconsin private-sector employers covered by the NLRA. (r8)
A Wisconsin employer with a blanket no-recording policy and no Section 7 carve-out (organizing, mutual aid, complaints about working conditions, evidence-gathering for grievances) risks a Section 8(a)(1) charge. The conservative Wisconsin policy identifies a specific business interest (trade secrets, HIPAA-protected information, attorney-client communications, safety investigations), carves out Section 7 activity, and avoids blanket "no recording at any time on company premises" language.
NLRB GC 25-05 (February 2025). General Counsel Memorandum GC 25-05 (Feb. 14, 2025) rescinded a series of Biden-era GC memoranda and signaled a return to Boeing / LA Specialty Produce era prosecutorial posture. GC 25-05 narrows the practical reach of Stericycle without overruling it. Stericycle remains good Board law; only enforcement posture shifted. (r9)
NLRB GC 25-07 (June 2025). General Counsel Memorandum GC 25-07 (June 25, 2025) addresses surreptitious recording of NLRA collective-bargaining sessions specifically: a party that secretly records a bargaining session commits a per se violation (bad-faith bargaining under Section 8(a)(5) or Section 8(b)(3)). It is narrowly scoped and NOT a broad no-recording-rule clarification. Wisconsin employers and unions in NLRA bargaining should disclose any recording of bargaining sessions, even though § 968.31(2)(b) would otherwise permit it. (r11)
The Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development guidance on recording conversations explains how Wisconsin's one-party rule interacts with DVR vocational-rehabilitation client-counselor settings; it does not create a separate state regulatory regime. For broader treatment, see our [Can an employer record conversations without consent?](/can-an-employer-record-conversations-without-consent/) overview. (c15)

Lawyers and recording in Wisconsin: State Bar Ethics Opinion EF-24-01
The Wisconsin State Bar issued Formal Ethics Opinion EF-24-01 on February 6, 2024. The opinion addresses lawyer surreptitious recording and is the controlling Wisconsin attorney-ethics authority on the subject. The opinion replaced earlier Wisconsin ethics guidance (Ethics Opinion E-94-5) and reflects modern recording technology and the participant-consent rule under § 968.31(2)(c). (c16)
Key positions in EF-24-01:
- Recording a client without consent violates the lawyer's duties under SCR 20:1.4(b) (duty to communicate with client) and SCR 20:8.4(c) (dishonesty / misrepresentation). A Wisconsin lawyer cannot record their own client without disclosure.
- Recording opposing counsel is not per se unethical, but the opinion cautions Wisconsin attorneys to weigh the relationship and disciplinary risk before doing so. Surreptitious recording of opposing counsel can damage the working relationship and may trigger attorney-disciplinary review under collateral rules.
- Recording judges or court personnel is prohibited. A lawyer who surreptitiously records a Wisconsin judge or a member of court staff faces disciplinary exposure regardless of one-party consent under § 968.31(2)(c).
- Recording third-party witnesses, opposing-party non-clients, and unrepresented persons is generally permissible under the disciplinary rules, subject to other-source limits (the substantive participant-consent rule, the tortious-purpose limit, and any independent client-confidentiality obligations).
- False statements about whether recording is occurring violate SCR 20:4.1(a) (truthfulness in statements to others). A Wisconsin lawyer asked directly whether they are recording cannot lie about it, even where one-party consent makes the recording itself lawful.
The opinion is a significant freshness signal and is one of the few state-bar ethics treatments of recording specific to the WESCL participant-consent framework. Wisconsin litigators conducting investigations, defense counsel interviewing witnesses, and lawyers recording phone calls with opposing parties should read EF-24-01 in full and tailor their practice accordingly.
EF-24-01 is binding on Wisconsin attorneys as a formal ethics opinion, but it does not change the underlying criminal-law one-party rule under § 968.31(2)(c). A Wisconsin attorney who records a client without disclosure violates EF-24-01 and the SCR rules cited above, but their conduct is not a Class H felony under the WESCL. The disciplinary consequence is professional, not criminal.

Wisconsin deepfake and AI recording laws
Wisconsin enacted two distinct deepfake and synthetic-media statutes between 2023 and 2025. Placement, offense level, and enforcement mechanism differ.
2025 Wisconsin Act 34 (synthetic intimate representation / deepfake-NCII)
2025 Wisconsin Act 34 originated as 2025 Senate Bill 33 (companion 2025 Assembly Bill 33), was signed by Governor Tony Evers on October 2, 2025, and was published October 3, 2025. The Act amended Wis. Stat. § 942.09 in two main places:
- § 942.09(1)(e) defines "synthetic intimate representation" as a representation generated using technological means that uses an identifiable person's face, likeness, or other distinguishing characteristic to depict an intimate representation of that person, regardless of whether the representation includes components that are artificial, legally generated, or generally accessible, and that is so realistic that a reasonable person would believe it depicts conduct of the identifiable person. The definition is technology-neutral: AI-generated, deepfake, and face-swap intimate imagery all qualify.
- § 942.09(2)(am)4 makes it a Class I felony (up to 3 years 6 months' prison and $10,000 fine) to post, publish, distribute, or exhibit a synthetic intimate representation of an identifiable person with intent to coerce, harass, or intimidate. The companion provision at § 942.09(3m)(a)3 reaches related posting conduct. (c9, c12)
Three points to remember. Placement: synthetic intimate representation is § 942.09, NOT § 942.08 (the separate voyeurism / surveillance-device statute). Bill provenance: the operative bill was 2025 SB 33, enacted as Act 34; earlier baseline references to "AB 553" or "SB 466" were wrong. Felony class: the posting offense is Class I (3 years 6 months); the WESCL audio-interception offense at § 968.31(1) is Class H (6 years). Do not conflate.
2023 Wisconsin Act 123 (election synthetic-media disclaimer)
2023 Wisconsin Act 123 addresses a different problem: AI-generated political-campaign media. The Act requires AI disclaimers on any audio or video communication paid for by a candidate committee, legislative campaign committee, political action committee, independent expenditure committee, political party, recall committee, or referendum committee, where the communication contains "synthetic media" (audio or video substantially produced by generative AI). Audio communications must include "Contains content generated by AI" at both the beginning and end. Forfeiture up to $1,000 per violation; broadcasters and carriers are shielded. (c17)
Act 123 is distinct from Act 34. Act 34 covers deepfake intimate imagery (Class I felony). Act 123 covers election-period synthetic media (campaign-finance regulated, $1,000 forfeiture). A single piece of fabricated media could trigger both.
Federal TAKE IT DOWN Act overlay
The federal TAKE IT DOWN Act, Pub. L. 119-12, signed May 19, 2025, criminalizes knowing publication of non-consensual intimate imagery (including AI deepfakes) and requires covered platforms to remove flagged content (and known identical copies) within 48 hours. The criminal prohibition was effective on signing; platform compliance under Section 3 takes effect May 19, 2026 (9 days from this article's publication date) and is enforced by the FTC. (r3)
Wisconsin victims of non-consensual intimate imagery have a stacked remedy framework: state criminal prosecution under § 942.09 (with the Act 34 expansion), state civil remedies under privacy and tort law, and federal remedies under TAKE IT DOWN. Consider filing a DMCA takedown notice for any copyright-eligible material in the deepfake source as a parallel takedown vector.
Admissibility of recordings in Wisconsin courts (Wis. Stat. § 885.365)
Wis. Stat. § 885.365 governs the admissibility of recorded telephone conversations in Wisconsin civil proceedings. The statute is part of Wisconsin's broader evidentiary framework at chapter 885 and pairs with the WESCL participant-consent rule at § 968.31(2)(c). A recording made lawfully under the participant-consent rule is generally admissible in a Wisconsin civil proceeding if the proper § 885.365 foundation is laid (authentication, chain of custody, and where applicable participant identification). (c18)
General framework for using a Wisconsin recording as evidence: authentication under Wis. Stat. § 909.01 (voice identification, distinctive characteristics, or recorder testimony); relevance under Wis. Stat. § 904.01; hearsay treatment under chapter 908 (admissions, present-sense impression, excited utterance, recorded recollection, business records, and other exceptions cover most participant-consent material); lawfulness of capture under § 968.31(3), which excludes recordings obtained in violation of § 968.31 from admission in any proceeding except to prove a § 968.31 violation; and the § 885.365 foundation for recorded telephone conversations specifically.
Practical evidence handling: save the unaltered original with metadata; note participants and location; keep documented backups; do not edit, splice, or annotate (edited clips are easy to challenge under authentication and the Wisconsin Best Evidence Rule at Wis. Stat. § 910.02); for criminal matters, consult counsel before disclosing outside privileged channels. For supplementary background, see the Wisconsin State Law Library wiretapping topic page.
Wisconsin law-enforcement body cameras (Wis. Stat. § 165.87)
Wis. Stat. § 165.87 governs body-worn cameras used by Wisconsin law-enforcement officers. The statute was last substantively amended by 2021 Wisconsin Act 240; codification is current through 2025 Wis. Act 170 and Supreme Court Orders in effect on May 22, 2026. (c19)
Subsection (1) requires written policies on use, maintenance, and storage; officer training on the policies; training for employees handling body-camera data; periodic compliance review; and online publication of the policies if the agency maintains a website. Subsection (2) sets the data-retention floor at a minimum of 120 days after recording, with extended retention for recordings depicting a death, injury, custodial arrest, authorized search, or use of force (retained until final disposition of any investigation, case, or complaint, with a narrow firearm-on-injured-animal exception). The 120-day floor was added by 2021 Wisconsin Act 240. Subsection (3) makes body-camera data subject to Wisconsin's Public Records Law at Wis. Stat. § 19.35, with privacy carve-outs for sensitive crime victims, minors, and recordings made in private locations.
Practical question: how do I get a Wisconsin body-camera recording? File a public-records request with the law-enforcement agency under § 19.35. Identify the date, time, and location of the encounter, the officer (if known), and the case or incident number. The agency must respond as soon as practicable and without delay; complete denials must cite a specific Public Records Law exception. A Wisconsin resident denied a recording may seek a writ of mandamus in circuit court under § 19.37.
The body-camera regime is separate from the WESCL audio-recording chapter. An officer's body-camera recording in a public place where conversations are audible to bystanders does not violate § 968.31 because the recorded persons lack a reasonable expectation that their conversation is private. An officer recording inside a private home during a lawful entry may capture covered "oral communication," but the color-of-law one-party exception at § 968.31(2)(b) authorizes the recording where the officer is a participant or has one party's consent.
Federal overlay: ECPA, FCC, NLRB, and TAKE IT DOWN Act
Federal law operates as a one-party-consent floor for Wisconsin. Where Wisconsin is more protective (the broader-than-federal "any other injurious act" exception), Wisconsin governs. Where federal law imposes additional obligations, federal law applies on top.
ECPA, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522. The federal one-party-consent floor at 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) authorizes a private participant (or someone with one party's consent) to intercept, unless for a criminal or tortious purpose. Civil remedies under 18 U.S.C. § 2520 parallel Wisconsin's § 968.31(2m). (r1)
DOJ Justice Manual § 9-7.302. The DOJ Justice Manual section on consensual monitoring is the federal one-party-consent default for federal investigators in Wisconsin. (r2)
FCC Declaratory Ruling 24-17. AI-generated voices in robocalls are "artificial or prerecorded voice" under the TCPA, requiring prior express written consent before AI-voice calls to wireless numbers and residential marketing lines. In force as of May 2026. (r4)
FCC 24-24 One-to-One Consent Rule (VACATED). Vacated by the Eleventh Circuit in Insurance Marketing Coalition Ltd. v. FCC, mandate April 30, 2025. The pre-existing prior-express-written-consent regime under 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(2)-(3) governs marketing robocalls and texts. Always note the vacatur. (r5)
47 C.F.R. § 64.501 (REMOVED). The carrier recording-disclosure beep-tone rule was removed effective November 20, 2017 (82 Fed. Reg. 48439). Do not cite as a live regulation. (r6)
TAKE IT DOWN Act, Pub. L. 119-12. Signed May 19, 2025; criminalizes knowing publication of non-consensual intimate imagery (including AI deepfakes); imposes a 48-hour platform notice-and-takedown obligation effective May 19, 2026 (9 days from this article's publication). FTC enforces. (r3)
NLRB Stericycle, GC 25-05, GC 25-07. Workplace rules are governed by the Section 7 framework set in Stericycle, narrowed in enforcement posture (but not overruled) by GC 25-05, and supplemented by GC 25-07's bargaining-session focus. See Workplace recording above. (r8, r9, r11)
FTC v. Ring (2023). $5.8 million consumer redress and a comprehensive privacy program after Ring gave employees broad access to customer video without adequate consent. Wisconsin smart-home users should configure devices to limit human review. (r10)
HIPAA Privacy Rule, 45 C.F.R. Part 164. Wisconsin healthcare covered entities and business associates must obtain HIPAA-compliant authorization before recording or disclosing protected health information, except where a treatment, payment, or operations exception applies. Patients, however, can record their own medical visits under Wisconsin's one-party rule (subject to the § 968.31(2)(c) tortious-purpose limit). HIPAA binds the covered entity, not the patient. (r12)
12 C.F.R. Part 1006 (CFPB Regulation F). Reg F does not impose an affirmative two-party consent requirement, but 12 C.F.R. § 1006.100(b) requires three-year retention of any debt-collection telephone recordings. State recording-consent rules apply on top because the FDCPA does not preempt more protective state law. (r13)
CALEA, 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010. Wisconsin telecommunications carriers and broadband providers must design networks to enable lawful court-ordered interception. Wisconsin law enforcement obtaining a federal Title III order or a state-court wiretap order under Wis. Stat. § 968.28 relies on CALEA-mandated carrier capabilities. (r14)
More Wisconsin laws
- Wisconsin Lemon Laws
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Wisconsin Recording Laws by Topic
Each of the 12 pages below covers a specific Wisconsin recording-law context in greater depth than this hub can. Use them to drill into the rule that applies to your situation.
- Wisconsin Audio Recording Laws: One-Party Consent Rules and Penalties (2026)
- [Wisconsin Dashcam Laws: Mounting Rules, Audio Recording, and Evidence (2026)](/united-states-recording-laws/one-party-consent-states/wisconsin-recording-laws/dashcam/)
- Wisconsin Landlord-Tenant Recording Laws: Cameras, Surveillance, and Privacy (2026)
- Wisconsin Medical Recording Laws: Patient Rights, HIPAA, and Consent (2026)
- Wisconsin Phone Call Recording Laws: Consent Rules for All Call Types (2026)
- Wisconsin Laws on Recording Police: Your Rights and Limitations (2026)
- Wisconsin Laws on Recording in Public: Filming, Photography, and Privacy (2026)
- Wisconsin School Recording Laws: Student, Parent, and Teacher Rights (2026)
- Wisconsin Security Camera Laws: Home, Business, and HOA Rules (2026)
- Wisconsin Video Recording Laws: Surveillance, Filming, and Privacy Rules (2026)
- Wisconsin Voyeurism and Hidden Camera Laws: Privacy Crimes and Penalties (2026)
- Wisconsin Workplace Recording Laws: Employee and Employer Rights (2026)
More Wisconsin Laws
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- Wisconsin Emancipation Laws
- Wisconsin Expungement Laws
- Wisconsin Hit and Run Laws
- Wisconsin Lemon Laws
- Wisconsin Power of Attorney Laws
- Wisconsin Self-Defense Laws
- Wisconsin Sexting Laws
- Wisconsin Squatters Rights Laws
- Wisconsin Statute of Limitations