Michigan Recording Laws (2026): Consent Rules, Penalties, and the Participant Exception

Michigan's eavesdropping statute is one of the more frequently misunderstood recording laws in the United States. The statute, MCL 750.539c, is written as an all-party consent requirement: it prohibits any person from recording a private conversation without the consent of all participants. Yet Michigan courts have interpreted it to function as a one-party consent rule in practice, because a party to a conversation is not recording "the private discourse of others," the phrase on which the prohibition turns.
This page is the Michigan recording law hub for RecordingLaw.com. It covers the controlling statutory framework, the key cases that shaped the participant exception, penalties, federal overlays, and special recording contexts. Each subtopic has its own dedicated spoke page with deeper analysis; links appear throughout this article and in the Topic Index at the bottom. For a state-by-state comparison, see our guide to two-party consent states.
Quick Answer: Is Michigan a One-Party or Two-Party Consent State?
Michigan's eavesdropping statute, MCL 750.539c, is written as an all-party consent law. It prohibits any person from using a device to eavesdrop on a private conversation without the consent of all parties. On its face, this would make Michigan a two-party (all-party) consent state. (c3)
The Michigan Court of Appeals changed that picture in Sullivan v. Gray, 117 Mich. App. 476, 324 N.W.2d 58 (1982). The court held that a participant in a conversation cannot eavesdrop upon it, because the statute defines eavesdropping as recording "the private discourse of others." A party to the conversation is recording their own conversation, not someone else's. This textual reading created the participant exception: if you are in the conversation, one-party consent (your own) is legally sufficient under Michigan law. (c10)
The Michigan Supreme Court had a chance to revisit Sullivan when it accepted a certified question in In re Certified Question, 959 N.W.2d 172 (Mich. 2021). It declined to answer, leaving Sullivan as controlling precedent. (c16)
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit applied parallel logic in Fisher v. Perron, 30 F.4th 289 (6th Cir. 2022), dismissing claims under both the federal Wiretap Act and MCL 750.539c where the recorder was a party to the conversations at issue. (c14)
Most recently, U.S. District Judge Linda Parker (E.D. Mich.) granted summary judgment for Project Veritas in AFT Michigan v. Project Veritas Action Fund, No. 4:17-cv-13292 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 30, 2026). The court dismissed all Michigan Eavesdropping Statute claims, holding that participant recording does not violate MCL 750.539c. As of May 2026, no appeal has been filed and this remains a district court decision subject to potential Sixth Circuit review. The citation URL has not yet been confirmed in public dockets; verify at PACER (Case No. 4:17-cv-13292) before relying on the ruling in legal proceedings. (afp)
Bottom line: Michigan operates in practice as a one-party consent state for participants in a conversation. A person who is not part of the conversation must have all-party consent before recording it, or face felony liability.
| Scenario | Michigan Rule |
|---|---|
| Recording a conversation you are part of | Lawful (participant exception applies) |
| Recording a conversation you are NOT part of | Felony (all-party consent required) |
| Third party physically present but not participating | All-party consent required |
| Recording in a public place | Generally lawful (no private-place protection) |
| Secret recording by a participant | Lawful under the participant exception |
Legal disclaimer: This page provides general educational information only and does not constitute legal advice. Whether the participant exception applies depends on the specific facts of your situation, including whether you qualify as a participant and whether the location is a "private place" under MCL 750.539a. Consult a licensed Michigan attorney before making recording decisions with legal consequences.

Michigan's Eavesdropping Statute: What the Law Actually Says
Michigan's eavesdropping law is codified at MCL 750.539a through 750.539g, enacted by Act 319 of 1966 and last substantively amended by 2004 Act 156. The core statutory framework has been in place for nearly 60 years. (c22)
MCL 750.539a: Definitions. The definitions section is where the participant exception originates. It defines "eavesdrop" as "to overhear, record, amplify, or transmit any part of the private discourse of others without the consent of all parties thereto." (c1) The phrase "private discourse of others" limits the prohibition to conversations in which the recorder is not a participant. The same section defines "private place" as a location where a person may reasonably expect to be safe from casual or hostile intrusion or surveillance, explicitly excluding places to which the public or a substantial group of the public has access. (c2) A busy restaurant, a public park, or a government building lobby would generally not qualify as a private place. A bedroom, a private office, or a locked vehicle likely would.
MCL 750.539c: The core prohibition. This is the felony eavesdropping statute. It makes it unlawful for any person, whether present or absent from the conversation, to willfully use any device to eavesdrop upon a private conversation without the consent of all parties. (c3) The "present or absent" language was interpreted by Sullivan v. Gray to describe the recorder's physical location relative to the device, not their status as a participant in the conversation. That reading reinforces that the participant exception is grounded in the statute's text, not invented by courts.
MCL 750.539d: Private-place visual recording. This provision extends the statute's protection to observation and visual recording in private places. It prohibits installing or using a device in a private place for the purpose of observing, recording, transmitting, or photographing the sounds or events occurring there, without the consent of the person entitled to privacy. (c5) The statute includes a security-monitoring carve-out for dwelling owners and occupants, discussed in the Special Contexts section below. (c7)
MCL 750.539e through 750.539g address divulging eavesdropped information, manufacturing or possessing eavesdropping devices, and related offenses. These are addressed in the Penalties section.
For a subsection-by-subsection analysis of each statutory provision, see our Michigan audio recording laws spoke page.

Penalties for Illegal Recording in Michigan
Michigan imposes felony-level penalties for eavesdropping violations. There is no misdemeanor tier: every recording offense under MCL 750.539 is a felony. Civil liability for invasion of privacy may also apply independently.
| Offense | Statute | Maximum Prison | Maximum Fine |
|---|---|---|---|
| Eavesdropping on a private conversation without all-party consent | MCL 750.539c | 2 years | $2,000 |
| Installing or using a device in a private place without consent | MCL 750.539d | 2 years | $2,000 |
| Distributing recordings obtained in violation of MCL 750.539d | MCL 750.539d | 5 years | $5,000 |
| Divulging information obtained through unlawful eavesdropping | MCL 750.539e | 2 years | $2,000 |
| Manufacturing, possessing, or selling eavesdropping devices | MCL 750.539f | 2 years | $2,000 |
The distribution penalty under MCL 750.539d is the steepest in the statute: sharing or publishing a recording made covertly in a private place carries up to 5 years imprisonment and a $5,000 fine, even if the underlying recording itself carried only a 2-year maximum. (c6) This enhanced penalty reflects the legislature's judgment that distribution amplifies the privacy harm.
Recording in violation of MCL 750.539c may also result in civil liability. Michigan courts have permitted plaintiffs to seek damages for invasion of privacy arising from unlawfully obtained recordings. The civil and criminal tracks operate independently: a prosecutor's decision not to charge does not bar a civil suit.
Penalty note: These penalties apply to third-party eavesdropping and to recording in private places without consent. A participant recording their own conversation under the Sullivan exception is not committing an offense under MCL 750.539c.

The Participant Exception: Sullivan, Fisher, and AFT Michigan v. Project Veritas
The participant exception has a 44-year interpretive history in Michigan courts, and its legal foundation has only grown stronger over time.
Sullivan v. Gray (1982). The exception originates with Sullivan v. Gray, 117 Mich. App. 476, 324 N.W.2d 58 (1982). The Michigan Court of Appeals held that a party to a conversation cannot eavesdrop upon it, because the statute defines eavesdropping as recording "the private discourse of others." The court found the statutory language unambiguous: a participant is recording their own conversation, not someone else's discourse. (c10) Sullivan also addressed the "any person who is present or who is not present" language in MCL 750.539c and held that this phrase describes physical location relative to the recording device, not participant status. This textual reading prevents prosecutors from arguing that an absent participant is somehow an eavesdropper on their own conversation. (c11) Sullivan further held that a participant's own consent to record does not extend authorization to a non-participant: if a third party who is not part of the conversation wants to record it, all-party consent is required regardless of whether a participant is also recording. (c21)
Lewis v. LeGrow (2003). The Michigan Court of Appeals reaffirmed the participant exception in Lewis v. LeGrow, 258 Mich. App. 175, 670 N.W.2d 675 (2003). The court confirmed that a bedroom is a private place under MCL 750.539a and that nonconsensual visual recording of intimate acts in a private place violates MCL 750.539d. (c12) Lewis remains the leading Michigan case on the intersection of the participant exception and private-place visual recording.
In re Certified Question (2021). When the Michigan Supreme Court accepted a certified question about the scope of MCL 750.539c in In re Certified Question, 959 N.W.2d 172 (Mich. 2021), it declined to answer it, leaving Sullivan v. Gray as controlling precedent on the participant exception without modification or endorsement. (c16)
Fisher v. Perron (2022). The Sixth Circuit applied the participant exception at both the federal and state levels in Fisher v. Perron, 30 F.4th 289 (6th Cir. 2022). A sibling had recorded phone calls about an estate dispute and was sued under both 18 U.S.C. § 2511 and MCL 750.539c. The Sixth Circuit dismissed both claims, applying parallel participant-exception logic and confirming doctrinal alignment between the federal Wiretap Act and Michigan's eavesdropping statute. (c14, c15)
AFT Michigan v. Project Veritas (2026). On March 30, 2026, U.S. District Judge Linda Parker (E.D. Mich.) granted summary judgment for Project Veritas in AFT Michigan v. Project Veritas Action Fund, No. 4:17-cv-13292 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 30, 2026). After nine years of litigation, the court dismissed all Michigan Eavesdropping Statute claims on the ground that participant recording does not violate MCL 750.539c. This is the most recent federal court decision addressing Michigan's participant exception. As of May 2026, no appeal has been filed; this remains a district court decision subject to Sixth Circuit review. No public docket URL has been confirmed; verify at PACER (Case No. 4:17-cv-13292) before relying on this ruling in any legal proceeding. (afp)
The consistent thread across all five decisions spans four decades: Michigan courts and federal courts applying Michigan law have uniformly held that participant recording is outside the scope of the eavesdropping prohibition.

Federal Law Overlay: ECPA, TCPA, and FCC Rules
Federal law applies concurrently with Michigan's eavesdropping statute. A recording that complies with Michigan law may still violate federal law, and vice versa. This section summarizes the principal federal frameworks. The Michigan phone calls spoke covers TCPA consent scenarios in depth.
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA). The federal Wiretap Act at 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) independently prohibits the intentional interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications. (c17) It applies to all recording activity in Michigan regardless of state law outcomes. The ECPA defines "oral communication" as any communication uttered by a person who exhibits an expectation that the communication is not subject to interception under circumstances that justify that expectation, per 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2). (c19) "Intercept" is defined at 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) as the aural or other acquisition of communication contents through any electronic, mechanical, or other device. (c20)
Federal one-party consent exception. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) permits a party to a communication to record it without others' consent unless the recording is made to commit a criminal or tortious act. (c18) This federal exception mirrors Michigan's participant exception. Fisher v. Perron confirmed the two provisions operate in alignment: a participant who records a conversation for an ordinary purpose is protected under both. Where a recording is made to extort, defraud, or commit another tort, the federal exception does not apply even if the recorder is a participant.
TCPA and FCC rules. The Telephone Consumer Protection Act and FCC implementing rules at 47 CFR § 64.1200(a)(1) and (a)(3) impose prior express written consent requirements for autodialed and prerecorded calls to wireless numbers and residential landlines. (r13) These are independent of Michigan's consent framework and apply to businesses making outbound calls to Michigan residents. The FCC's 2024 Declaratory Ruling, DA 24-17 (Feb. 8, 2024), clarified that AI-generated voice calls constitute "artificial or prerecorded voice" under the TCPA, subjecting them to the same prior-express-consent requirements. (r1)
FCC beep-tone rule. 47 CFR § 64.501 requires telephone service providers (not individual callers) to provide a beep tone or give notice to all parties when monitoring or recording is in progress. (r3) This is a carrier obligation, not a requirement on individual call participants.
DOJ consensual monitoring. DOJ Justice Manual § 9-7.302 permits federal law enforcement agents to conduct consensual monitoring of conversations with the consent of one party to the communication, under federal authority and independent of state law. (r4) State recording restrictions do not constrain federal agents operating under their own consent authority.
Interaction of federal and state law. Where federal law sets a stricter standard than Michigan law, federal law governs for the conduct it covers. Where Michigan law is stricter (for example, because a court reads the participant exception narrowly in a particular context), Michigan law governs Michigan-based conduct. The two frameworks coexist; neither fully displaces the other. Anyone recording communications involving multiple states should analyze both independently.

Special Contexts: Medical, School, Security Camera, and Intimate Recordings
Several recording scenarios in Michigan trigger legal frameworks beyond MCL 750.539, because the subject matter or location brings in federal or specialized state law. This section provides hub-level context; each dedicated spoke carries the full analysis.
Healthcare and HIPAA. Recording in a healthcare setting may implicate HIPAA's Privacy Rule at 45 CFR § 164.502, which restricts access to protected health information independently of state eavesdropping law. (r9) An audio or video recording that captures a patient's health information in a clinical area can create HIPAA exposure for the recorder and the covered entity, even if Michigan's participant exception would otherwise permit the recording. See our Michigan medical and healthcare recording laws spoke for full analysis.
Schools and FERPA. Recording in a school setting may implicate the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act where the recording captures student education records. The U.S. Department of Education's Student Privacy Office has issued FERPA guidance addressing audio and video recording in educational settings. (r11) FERPA authorization requirements apply independently of Michigan's eavesdropping statute. See our Michigan school recording laws spoke for full analysis.
Intimate recordings. Nonconsensual visual recording of intimate acts in a private place is a direct violation of MCL 750.539d, regardless of participant status. In Lewis v. LeGrow, 258 Mich. App. 175, 670 N.W.2d 675 (2003), the Michigan Court of Appeals confirmed that a bedroom qualifies as a private place under the statute and that covert videotaping of intimate acts violates MCL 750.539d. (c13) The participant exception does not extend to surreptitious intimate recording: the statute protects the privacy of persons in the location regardless of whether the recorder was present. For detailed coverage of voyeurism-adjacent recording, see our Michigan voyeurism and hidden camera laws spoke.
Security cameras in residences. MCL 750.539d contains a carve-out for dwelling owners and occupants who install or use security monitoring systems. (c7) The exception does not apply where the device is directed at a bathroom or changing area. Michigan law does not require notice or consent for general-purpose exterior home security cameras pointed at the owner's own property. See our Michigan security camera laws spoke for landlord-tenant, common-area, and rental-property scenarios.
Public places. Locations open to the public or to a substantial group of the public fall outside the statute's definition of "private place" under MCL 750.539a. (c2) Recording audio or video in a public setting where no person has a reasonable expectation of privacy is generally lawful under Michigan law. See our recording in public places in Michigan spoke for analysis of specific public-recording contexts, including government facilities and semi-private spaces.

Workplace Recording in Michigan: State Law and Federal NLRA Overlay
Michigan's participant exception applies in the workplace. An employee who is a party to a work conversation may generally record it without coworkers' or supervisors' consent under Sullivan v. Gray. (c10) The recording does not need to be disclosed in advance.
However, two federal frameworks add complexity that Michigan law alone does not address.
Employer no-recording policies. An employer may impose a workplace no-recording policy as a condition of employment. Where such a policy exists, recording may violate it even if Michigan's eavesdropping statute would not prohibit the recording. Employees who violate a lawful no-recording policy risk disciplinary action up to and including termination, separate from any question of criminal liability.
NLRA federal overlay. The National Labor Relations Board held in Stericycle, Inc., 372 NLRB No. 113 (2023) that employer workplace rules with a reasonable tendency to chill employees' Section 7 rights are presumptively unlawful under the NLRA, even if facially neutral. (r5) An overbroad no-recording policy that prevents employees from documenting workplace safety concerns or organizing activity may violate the NLRA regardless of Michigan law. This is the current NLRB standard; Board doctrine is subject to change with Board composition.
NLRB General Counsel Memorandum 25-07 (June 25, 2025) reflects the NLRB General Counsel's current enforcement position that surreptitious recording of collective bargaining sessions may constitute an unfair labor practice. (r7) This is prosecutorial guidance, not a Board decision or court judgment; it does not have the force of settled law. It does not alter Michigan's participant exception analysis but creates a federal compliance consideration for employers with unionized workforces in Michigan.
Both the NLRA overlay and Michigan's consent framework must be analyzed separately. Compliance with one does not ensure compliance with the other. See our Michigan workplace recording laws spoke for a full scenario-by-scenario analysis.

Recording Phone Calls in Michigan
A party to a phone call may record it under Michigan's participant exception. The same logic that applies to in-person conversations applies to telephone calls: the caller or the called party is a participant in the communication, not an eavesdropper on "the private discourse of others." Fisher v. Perron, 30 F.4th 289 (6th Cir. 2022) arose from phone call recordings, and the Sixth Circuit's dismissal of MCL 750.539c claims confirms that the participant exception applies to telephone conversations. (c15)
Federal law aligns: 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) permits a party to a communication to record it without others' consent. (c18) For phone calls crossing state lines, the caller must also be aware of the recording laws of the other party's state. Several states require all-party consent for telephone calls, and those states' laws may apply to a call even if one end is in Michigan.
The FCC beep-tone rule at 47 CFR § 64.501 applies to telephone service providers, not individual callers, and does not create an independent consent obligation for personal call recording. (r3)
For detailed coverage of call recording scenarios including business lines, customer service calls, two-state calls, and AI-assisted call recording, see our recording phone calls in Michigan spoke.

Recording Police Officers in Michigan
Recording police officers performing their official duties in a public space is protected by the First Amendment. The right to record law enforcement in public has been recognized by federal circuit courts and is not displaced by Michigan's eavesdropping statute, because public spaces where officers are performing duties are not "private places" under MCL 750.539a. (c2) A person recording a traffic stop, an arrest, or police activity on a public street is recording in a place where there is no reasonable expectation of freedom from observation.
Michigan has no specific statute authorizing or restricting the recording of police officers, so the analysis depends on the First Amendment right to record alongside the private-place exclusion in the eavesdropping statute. Recording that requires entering a non-public area, interfering with police operations, or capturing private conversations outside public-duty contexts may raise different questions.
For a full First Amendment analysis, limitations on recording inside police stations or county jails, and what happens when an officer attempts to seize a recording device, see our recording police in Michigan spoke.

Michigan Recording Laws: Topic Index
RecordingLaw.com publishes 12 Michigan subtopic spokes that address specific recording scenarios in depth. Each spoke applies the participant exception framework to a distinct factual context, cites Michigan-specific authority, and addresses relevant federal overlays. Use the index below to navigate to the topic that matches your situation.
Recording Phone Calls in Michigan: Covers participant consent for personal calls, business call recording, two-state call scenarios, and TCPA implications for outbound calls. The Fisher v. Perron fact pattern (estate-dispute phone recording) is analyzed in depth.
Michigan Workplace Recording Laws: Covers employee recording of supervisors, employer audio monitoring of employees, no-recording policies, and the NLRA Section 7 framework under Stericycle (2023). Both sides of the employment relationship are addressed.
Michigan Audio Recording Laws: The core spoke for in-person conversation recording. Includes a subsection-by-subsection walkthrough of MCL 750.539a through 750.539g, participant exception mechanics, and private-versus-public place analysis.
Michigan Video Recording Laws: Covers MCL 750.539d visual recording in private places, the distinction between audio-only and audio-video recording, and the legal analysis for recording conversations on video without disclosing the camera.
Recording Police in Michigan: Full First Amendment analysis of the right to record law enforcement, limits during active investigations, device seizure cases, and what to do if an officer orders you to stop recording.
Michigan Security Camera Laws: Covers the MCL 750.539d dwelling-owner security-monitoring exception, common-area cameras in multi-unit housing, landlord camera placement rules, and business surveillance systems.
Michigan School Recording Laws: Covers student and parent recording rights in IEP meetings and school hearings, FERPA's interaction with Michigan eavesdropping law, and school district recording policies.
Michigan Medical and Healthcare Recording Laws: Covers HIPAA's Privacy Rule overlay, patient rights to record provider conversations, recording in clinical areas, and the intersection with MCL 750.539c for healthcare workers and patients.
Michigan Landlord-Tenant Recording Laws: Covers tenant recording of landlord interactions, landlord installation of cameras in rental properties, private-place analysis for leased spaces, and notice requirements.
Michigan Dashcam Laws: Covers dashcam legality for personal and commercial vehicles, audio capture in a vehicle, sharing dashcam footage with law enforcement, and traffic-stop recording.
Recording in Public Places in Michigan: Covers streets, parks, government buildings, courthouses, and semi-public venues. Addresses when a nominally public space still carries a privacy expectation and how MCL 750.539a's public-access exclusion applies.
Michigan Voyeurism and Hidden Camera Laws: Covers MCL 750.539d criminal penalties for covert surveillance in private places, upskirt and intimate recording, bathroom and changing-room cameras, and the Lewis v. LeGrow bedroom-recording analysis.
For the broader national context, see US recording laws by state and our guide to two-party consent states. Michigan is often compared to Illinois recording laws and California recording laws, both of which have stricter all-party consent frameworks without a parallel participant exception.
For AI-specific recording questions in Michigan, including consent rules for AI meeting assistants and transcription bots, see Michigan AI meeting recording laws.
Michigan Recording Laws by Topic
Each of the 12 pages below covers a specific Michigan recording-law context in greater depth than this hub can. Use them to drill into the rule that applies to your situation.
- Michigan Audio Recording Laws: Consent Rules, Statutes, and Penalties (2026)
- Michigan Dashcam Laws: Windshield Rules, Audio Recording, and Legal Use (2026)
- Michigan Landlord-Tenant Recording Laws: Surveillance, Privacy, and Tenant Rights (2026)
- Michigan Medical Recording Laws: Patient Rights, HIPAA, and Doctor Visits (2026)
- Michigan Phone Call Recording Laws: Rules for Landlines, Cell Phones, and VoIP (2026)
- Michigan Laws on Recording Police: Your Rights and Legal Limits (2026)
- Michigan Laws on Recording in Public: First Amendment Rights and Limits (2026)
- Michigan School Recording Laws: Rules for Students, Parents, and Teachers (2026)
- Michigan Security Camera Laws: Rules for Homes, Businesses, and Neighbors (2026)
- Michigan Video Recording Laws: Surveillance Rules, Consent, and Penalties (2026)
- Michigan Voyeurism and Hidden Camera Laws: MCL 750.539j Penalties and Protections (2026)
- Michigan Workplace Recording Laws: Employee and Employer Rights (2026)
Sources and References
- MCL 750.539a(legislature.mi.gov).gov
- MCL 750.539a(legislature.mi.gov).gov
- MCL 750.539c(legislature.mi.gov).gov
- MCL 750.539c(legislature.mi.gov).gov
- MCL 750.539d(legislature.mi.gov).gov
- MCL 750.539d(legislature.mi.gov).gov
- MCL 750.539d(legislature.mi.gov).gov
- MCL 750.539e(legislature.mi.gov).gov
- MCL 750.539f(legislature.mi.gov).gov
- Sullivan v. Gray, 117 Mich. App. 476, 324 N.W.2d 58 (1982)(courtlistener.com)
- Sullivan v. Gray, 117 Mich. App. 476, 324 N.W.2d 58 (1982)(courtlistener.com)
- Lewis v. LeGrow, 258 Mich. App. 175, 670 N.W.2d 675 (2003)(courtlistener.com)
- Lewis v. LeGrow, 258 Mich. App. 175, 670 N.W.2d 675 (2003)(courtlistener.com)
- Fisher v. Perron, 30 F.4th 289 (6th Cir. 2022)(law.justia.com)
- Fisher v. Perron, 30 F.4th 289 (6th Cir. 2022)(law.justia.com)
- In re Certified Question, 959 N.W.2d 172 (Mich. 2021)()
- 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a)(uscode.house.gov).gov
- 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d)(uscode.house.gov).gov
- 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2)(uscode.house.gov).gov
- 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4)(uscode.house.gov).gov
- Sullivan v. Gray, 117 Mich. App. 476, 324 N.W.2d 58 (1982)(courtlistener.com)
- MCL 750.539 et seq., Act 319 of 1966; MCL 750.539d as amended by 2004 Act 156(legislature.mi.gov).gov
- AFT Michigan v. Project Veritas Action Fund, No. 4:17-cv-13292 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 30, 2026)()
- FCC Declaratory Ruling, DA 24-17 (Feb. 8, 2024)(fcc.gov).gov
- 47 CFR § 64.501(ecfr.gov).gov
- DOJ Justice Manual § 9-7.302(justice.gov).gov
- Stericycle, Inc., 372 NLRB No. 113 (2023)(nlrb.gov).gov
- NLRB GC Memo 25-07 (June 25, 2025)(nlrb.gov).gov
- HHS OCR HIPAA FAQ (Recording in Treatment Areas)(hhs.gov).gov
- USDOE Student Privacy Office, FERPA and School Recording Guidance(studentprivacy.ed.gov).gov
- 47 CFR § 64.1200(a)(1), (a)(3)(ecfr.gov).gov