Squatters Rights by State: Adverse Possession Laws (2026)

Squatters Rights in the United States: Adverse Possession Laws Explained
Every US state recognizes adverse possession, the legal doctrine colloquially called "squatters rights." A person who occupies land openly, continuously, exclusively, and hostilely for the state's statutory period (ranging from 5 to 30 years) can petition a court to transfer title under that state's adverse possession statute.
Information last verified on May 27, 2026. This article provides general legal information, not legal advice.
Jurisdiction scope: This article covers adverse possession and squatter-removal law across all 50 US states and the District of Columbia. It does not address Canadian provincial adverse possession doctrine or squatting law in other countries. Per-state detail pages (one for each jurisdiction in the table below) are forthcoming as state-level spokes in this cluster.
Squatter vs. Trespasser: What Is the Legal Difference?
A trespasser enters property without permission and without any claim of ownership. A squatter also enters without permission, but the squatter's conduct is directed toward the land as if the squatter owns it. That behavioral distinction is legally significant: a trespasser acquires no property rights no matter how long the trespass continues, while a squatter who satisfies each element of adverse possession for the full statutory period can petition a court to quiet title in the squatter's name. Under the objective hostility test articulated in Nome 2000 v. Fagerstrom, 799 P.2d 304, 309-310 (Alaska 1990), hostility does not require bad intent or knowledge that the land belongs to someone else. The claimant must simply have acted toward the land as an owner would act, without the true owner's permission. Good faith or bad faith is irrelevant to that inquiry. The practical boundary between a squatter and a trespasser therefore turns on whether the occupant's behavior, viewed objectively, resembles ownership rather than mere unauthorized presence.

The distinction also matters for removal strategy. A trespasser who entered within the past few days can typically be removed by police on criminal trespass grounds. A person who has lived on the property for months, paid utilities, and maintained the lawn presents a residency claim that most states require courts to adjudicate through a formal eviction or quiet title proceeding before removal. Property owners who skip that process and attempt self-help removal face civil and, in some states, criminal liability.
The Five Elements of Adverse Possession
To succeed on an adverse possession claim anywhere in the United States, a claimant must prove five elements by clear and convincing evidence: actual possession, continuous possession for the statutory period, open and notorious possession, exclusive possession, and hostile possession. Nome 2000 v. Fagerstrom, 799 P.2d 304, 309 (Alaska 1990) remains the most-cited single-jurisdiction articulation of this five-part framework; courts across the country apply substantively identical tests.

Actual possession requires a physical presence on the property and use of it in a manner consistent with its nature. Under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 325, California land is "possessed" only if it is protected by a substantial enclosure or is usually cultivated or improved. Montana similarly requires both continuous physical possession and payment of taxes under Mont. Code Ann. § 70-19-411.
Continuous possession does not mean the claimant must be on the property every moment of every day. Fagerstrom holds that continuity is measured against how an average owner of similar land would use it, calibrated to the character of the land; a claimant who uses remote tundra seasonally satisfies continuity if that is what a typical owner would do. 799 P.2d at 309.
Open and notorious possession puts the true owner on constructive notice. Fencing, cultivation, or building a structure typically satisfies this element. Secretive or hidden occupation fails.
Exclusive possession means the claimant does not share possession with the general public or with the true owner. Fagerstrom confirms that absolute exclusivity and major improvements are not required; the standard tracks what a comparable owner would do with the land. 799 P.2d at 309.
Hostile possession follows the objective test: the claimant acts toward the land as an owner, without the true owner's permission. Fagerstrom, 799 P.2d at 309-310. Neither bad faith nor good-faith belief in ownership is required; the claimant's subjective mental state is not the test.
All five elements must be proven for the full statutory period without interruption. If the true owner successfully asserts ownership rights during the period, the clock resets.
Statutory Periods by State: How Long Until Squatters Rights Vest?
Statutory periods across the 51 US jurisdictions range from 5 years (California, Montana, and Nevada) to 30 years (Louisiana and New Jersey). New York requires 10 years under N.Y. CPLR § 212(a) combined with N.Y. RPAPL §§ 501 and 511. Florida requires 7 years under Fla. Stat. §§ 95.16 and 95.18, plus payment of all property taxes and filing of a uniform return with the county property appraiser within 30 days of entry. California compresses the period to 5 years but requires payment of all property taxes for all 5 years, supported by certified records, under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 325. Texas uses a tiered scheme: 3 years under a recorded instrument (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.024), 5 years under a deed plus tax payments (§ 16.025), and 10 years by actual peaceable possession with cultivation, use, or enjoyment (§ 16.026); the 10-year track limits claims without a title instrument to 160 acres. Montana requires 5 years plus tax payment under Mont. Code Ann. § 70-19-411.

The table below lists every jurisdiction. Where a "Shorter Period (Color of Title / Recorded Deed)" is shown, that reduced period applies only when the claimant holds a facially valid but defective instrument of title and, in some states, also pays taxes. A dash indicates the state does not provide a statutory reduction for color of title. The "Property Taxes Required" column reflects only the general adverse possession track; some states impose an additional tax requirement on the shorter color-of-title track even when the general track does not require taxes.
Select a state below for a full guide to its adverse possession rules and squatter-removal process.
| State | Statutory Period | Shorter Period (Color of Title / Recorded Deed) | Property Taxes Required |
|---|---|---|---|
| Alabama | 10 years | None | No |
| Alaska | 10 years | None | No |
| Arizona | 10 years | 3 years | With deed/color of title (5-yr tracks) |
| Arkansas | 7 years | None | No |
| California | 5 years | None | Yes |
| Colorado | 18 years | 7 years | With color of title |
| Connecticut | 15 years | None | No |
| Delaware | 20 years | None | No |
| Florida | 7 years | 7 years | Yes |
| Georgia | 20 years | 7 years | No |
| Hawaii | 20 years | None | No |
| Idaho | 20 years | None | Yes |
| Illinois | 20 years | 7 years | With color of title (vacant land) |
| Indiana | 10 years | None | Yes |
| Iowa | 10 years | None | No |
| Kansas | 15 years | None | No |
| Kentucky | 15 years | 7 years | No |
| Louisiana | 30 years | 10 years | No |
| Maine | 20 years | None | No |
| Maryland | 20 years | None | No |
| Massachusetts | 20 years | None | No |
| Michigan | 15 years | None | No |
| Minnesota | 15 years | None | 5 consecutive yrs on separately assessed parcels |
| Mississippi | 10 years | None | No |
| Missouri | 10 years | None | No |
| Montana | 5 years | None | Yes |
| Nebraska | 10 years | None | No |
| Nevada | 5 years | None | Yes |
| New Hampshire | 20 years | None | No |
| New Jersey | 30 years | None | No |
| New Mexico | 10 years | None | Yes (color of title + taxes both required) |
| New York | 10 years | None | No |
| North Carolina | 20 years | 7 years | No |
| North Dakota | 20 years | None | No |
| Ohio | 21 years | None | No |
| Oklahoma | 5 years (was 15 before Nov. 1, 2023) | None | No |
| Oregon | 10 years | None | No |
| Pennsylvania | 21 years | 10 years | No |
| Rhode Island | 10 years | None | No |
| South Carolina | 10 years | None | No |
| South Dakota | 20 years | None | No |
| Tennessee | 7 years | None | No |
| Texas | 10 years | 5 years | With deed/color of title (5-yr track, S. 16.025) |
| Utah | 7 years | None | Yes |
| Vermont | 15 years | None | No |
| Virginia | 15 years | None | No |
| Washington | 10 years | 7 years | With color of title (7-yr track, RCW 7.28.070) |
| West Virginia | 10 years | None | No |
| Wisconsin | 20 years | 10 years | Yes for the 7-yr track (S. 893.27) |
| Wyoming | 10 years | None | No |
| District of Columbia | 15 years | None | No |
Sources for table: Ala. Code § 6-5-200; Alaska Stat. §§ 09.10.030, 34.07.020; Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 12-523 to 12-527; Ark. Code Ann. § 18-61-101; Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 322, 325; Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 38-41-101, 38-41-108; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-575; Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 7901; Fla. Stat. §§ 95.16, 95.18; O.C.G.A. §§ 44-5-163, 44-5-164; Haw. Rev. Stat. § 657-31; Idaho Code § 5-210; 735 ILCS 5/13-101, 5/13-110; Ind. Code §§ 34-11-2-11, 32-21-7-1; Iowa Code § 614.1(5); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-503; Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 413.010, 413.060; La. Civ. Code arts. 3486, 3473; Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 14, § 801; Md. Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-103; Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 21; Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5801; Minn. Stat. § 541.02; Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-13; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.010; Mont. Code Ann. § 70-19-411; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-202; Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 11.070, 11.110, 11.150; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:2; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-30; NMSA 1978, § 37-1-22; N.Y. CPLR § 212(a); N.Y. RPAPL §§ 501, 511, 521; N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 1-40, 1-38; N.D. Cent. Code § 28-01-04; Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.04; Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 93; tit. 60, § 333; Or. Rev. Stat. § 105.620; 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 5530, 5527.1; R.I. Gen. Laws § 34-7-1; S.C. Code Ann. §§ 15-67-210 to 15-67-260; S.D. Codified Laws § 15-3-1; Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-2-101; Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 16.024, 16.025, 16.026; Utah Code §§ 78B-2-208 to 78B-2-214; 12 V.S.A. § 501; Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-236; RCW 4.16.020, 7.28.050, 7.28.070; W. Va. Code § 55-2-1; Wis. Stat. §§ 893.25, 893.26, 893.27; Wyo. Stat. § 1-3-103; D.C. Code § 12-301(a)(1).
Note on medium-confidence rows: The statutory periods for Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Mississippi, New Jersey, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming reflect the well-established standard period confirmed across multiple secondary sources. Those states' official legislature websites were inaccessible via direct fetch during research (JavaScript-rendered or SSL-blocked). A final spot-check against each official .gov source is recommended before relying on these figures in a state-specific spoke article.
Color of Title and Tax Payment: How They Affect a Claim
Color of title refers to a document that appears on its face to convey ownership of real property but is legally defective for some reason: a forged deed, a deed from a grantor who lacked authority to convey, an unrecorded instrument, or a deed with a technical defect in the legal description. Cornell LII Wex defines color of title as a facially valid but legally defective ownership document (Cornell LII Wex, "Color of Title"). The critical practical effect is that many states reduce the adverse possession statutory period significantly when the claimant holds color of title. New York illustrates both mechanics: under N.Y. RPAPL § 511, entry under a written instrument or judgment, combined with 10 years of continued occupation, constitutes adverse possession under color of title. The underlying definitions governing who qualifies as an adverse possessor appear in N.Y. RPAPL § 501.
Color of title also affects the geographic scope of the claim. Without an instrument describing a specific parcel, an adverse possession claim extends only to the land the claimant actually occupied. With color of title describing a larger parcel, courts in many states hold that the claimant constructively possesses the entire parcel described in the instrument, even if only part was physically used, as long as the physically occupied portion satisfies the adversity elements.
Tax payment is a separate requirement in several states and interacts with color of title in varied ways. California requires tax payment on the general 5-year track under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 325 regardless of whether the claimant holds color of title. Montana requires both continuous possession and tax payment under Mont. Code Ann. § 70-19-411. Florida requires payment of all taxes and liens within one year of entry plus a uniform return filing under Fla. Stat. § 95.18. Colorado, Illinois, Oklahoma, and Washington impose a tax-payment requirement only on the shorter color-of-title track, not on the general longer-period track. Wisconsin separately requires tax payment on a 7-year expedited track under Wis. Stat. § 893.27 but not on the standard 20-year track under § 893.25. Property owners who discover an adverse claimant should check their tax records promptly: a claimant who has been paying property taxes for years has built a significant part of a statutory case in those states where tax payment is required.
The 2024-2025 Anti-Squatting Legislation Wave
A wave of states enacted statutes in 2024 and 2025 that sharply accelerated the removal of unauthorized occupants and, in several cases, criminalized the act of squatting itself. These laws create sheriff-administered or law-enforcement removal tracks that bypass the traditional court-supervised eviction timeline.

Florida led the wave with HB 621 (Ch. 2024-44), signed March 27, 2024, effective July 1, 2024. The law created Fla. Stat. § 82.036, which allows a residential property owner to file a verified complaint directly with the sheriff attesting that: the dwelling is residential; entry was unlawful; the occupant is not a current or former tenant, immediate family member, or co-owner; and no litigation regarding possession is pending. After the sheriff verifies ownership, the sheriff must without delay serve notice to immediately vacate and restore possession to the owner. Fla. Stat. § 82.036 (2024). Wrongful removal under this process entitles the displaced occupant to actual damages, triple the fair market rent, court costs, and attorney fees. Fla. Stat. § 82.036 (2024).
Georgia enacted HB 1017 (the Georgia Squatter Reform Act, effective April 24, 2024). The act amended O.C.G.A. § 16-7-21 to make entering land or premises for the purpose of residing there criminal trespass (unlawful squatting), amended Title 44, Chapter 11, Article 2 to provide a magistrate-court property-affidavit process, and authorizes a sheriff, deputy, or constable to turn out the occupant within three days of the owner's affidavit unless the occupant files a counter-affidavit. Ga. HB 1017 (2024); O.C.G.A. § 16-7-21; O.C.G.A. tit. 44, ch. 11, art. 2.
Alabama enacted HB 182 (effective June 1, 2024), which defines a squatter as a person who is not a lease party and not authorized by a tenant; squatters are excluded from Title 35, Chapters 9 and 9A eviction procedures and may be removed without a formal eviction action. The Alabama Governor's office confirmed the signing. 2024 Ala. Acts (HB 182); Alabama Governor's Office signing announcement (2024). The law also imposes criminal penalties for falsifying real-estate documents used to manufacture color of title.
West Virginia enacted the Stop Squatters Act (HB 4940, effective June 4, 2024), codified at W. Va. Code §§ 55-3C-1 and 55-3C-2. The act classifies squatting as criminal trespass; courts may not require a formal eviction to remove a squatter, and arrest is the primary removal mechanism. W. Va. Code §§ 55-3C-1, 55-3C-2 (2024).
Tennessee enacted Public Chapter 1009 (HB 1259/SB 795, effective July 1, 2024). A property owner files a verified complaint with the sheriff; the sheriff serves notice to immediately vacate and restores possession; arrest for trespass is authorized. Wrongful removal triggers triple fair market rent, actual damages, costs, and fees. Tenn. Pub. Ch. 1009 (2024); Tenn. General Assembly, HB 1259.
North Carolina enacted Session Law 2025-88 (effective December 1, 2025), creating an expedited removal track for unauthorized residential occupants: after the owner files an affidavit, the sheriff serves the occupant, a magistrate holds a hearing within roughly 48 hours, and a vacate order can follow shortly after. The fast track reaches true squatters, not holdover tenants. N.C. Sess. Law 2025-88 (2025).
Idaho enacted Idaho Code section 6-310A (HB 321, effective July 1, 2025), a sheriff-administered remedy under which a residential owner files a verified complaint under penalty of perjury and the sheriff serves a notice to vacate and may remove the occupants. The same law created new criminal offenses for fraudulently detaining or leasing real property. Idaho Code section 6-310A (2025).
Louisiana enacted Act 2024 No. 466 (effective August 1, 2024), which makes remaining on property more than five days after a valid notice to vacate a criminal trespass and authorizes an ex parte temporary restraining order for an owner who is denied use of the property by a person with no legal interest in it. 2024 La. Acts No. 466.
Maryland enacted Senate Bill 46 (Chapter 188, Acts of 2025, effective October 1, 2025), which requires a court to hold a wrongful detainer hearing within 10 business days of filing, accelerating the removal of unauthorized occupants. 2025 Md. Laws ch. 188.
The trend has continued into 2025 and 2026, with more states adopting or proposing similar measures, and several other states, including Nevada, Utah, and Virginia, offer separate criminal or expedited civil pathways. Because these procedures change quickly and reach only genuine unlawful occupants, an owner should confirm the current statute and process in the specific state before acting.
Jurisdiction reminder: The statutes above apply only in their respective states, and even a fast-track law reaches only genuine unlawful occupants, never a current or former tenant. Property owners in every other state must use the traditional court eviction process described in the next section.
How to Legally Remove a Squatter: No Self-Help Allowed
Self-help removal (changing locks, shutting off utilities, removing a squatter's belongings, or physically barring entry) is prohibited in every US state. California Courts Self-Help Center makes this explicit for California: property owners must use the unlawful detainer process in Superior Court; self-help measures including lockouts, utility shutoffs, or removal of belongings are prohibited. California Courts Self-Help Center, "Evictions."

Ejectment is the common-law action brought by a party with the right to possess property (but not currently in possession) against the party in actual possession; it requires proof of paramount or superior title. Cornell LII Wex, "Ejectment." Unlawful detainer is the modern statutory equivalent in most states, typically faster and cheaper than ejectment.
The removal process varies by jurisdiction:
California: The owner must file an unlawful detainer action in Superior Court. California Courts Self-Help Center, "Evictions."
Florida (with a 2024 sheriff track): For residential properties, the owner files a verified complaint directly with the sheriff under Fla. Stat. § 82.036 (not with the court), attesting to the four statutory conditions. The sheriff then verifies ownership and serves a notice to immediately vacate. Fla. Stat. § 82.036 (2024). For situations that do not meet the § 82.036 criteria (for example, the occupant is a former tenant), the standard court eviction process applies.
Texas: Property owners must use the eviction process in Justice Court. Police may remove a person present less than approximately one week on criminal trespass grounds, but anyone with a residency claim requires a formal eviction; hearings are typically set 10 to 21 days out, and the constable gives 24-hour notice before removal. Texas Law Help (approved by the Supreme Court of Texas), "Evicting a Squatter." Texas also allows an accelerated Motion for Summary Disposition specifically for squatters who entered unlawfully; the occupant must respond within four days or the owner receives a Writ of Possession without a hearing. Texas Law Help (approved by the Supreme Court of Texas), "Eviction."
New York: Property owners use the holdover proceeding in Housing Court (New York City) or the unlawful detainer process in local court. N.Y. RPAPL §§ 501 and 521 govern the substantive rights at issue.
Jurisdiction reminder: Removal procedures are entirely state-specific. The sheriff-complaint process available in Florida (Fla. Stat. § 82.036), Georgia, Alabama, West Virginia, and Tennessee does not exist in other states. Owners in all other states must proceed through the court eviction process.
Why Do Squatters Have Rights? The Legal History Behind Adverse Possession
Adverse possession is not a modern legal invention designed to reward trespassers. The doctrine traces to medieval English land law and was formalized in statutes of limitation as early as the Statute of Limitations 1623 and the Real Property Limitation Act 1833. American states adopted similar statutes of limitation on real property actions in the colonial and early post-independence period, and every state in the union has maintained one since. The doctrine serves three distinct legal and economic purposes.
First, adverse possession resolves title disputes that would otherwise be unresolvable. Before comprehensive recording systems, land boundaries were imprecise and competing grants from colonial governments often overlapped. A statute of limitations on ejectment and trespass actions gave courts a mechanism to quiet those disputes by recognizing the party in actual possession as the owner after a substantial period.
Second, the doctrine penalizes owners who abandon or fail to monitor their property. Property law across the common-law world reflects a background principle that land should be used productively. An owner who takes no interest in property for 10, 15, or 20 years has effectively forfeited the interest that statutes of limitation protect.
Third, adverse possession vindicates the reliance interests of occupants who have invested in improving and using land. Cornell LII Wex's treatment of color of title notes that a claimant with a facially valid instrument has a reasonable basis to believe ownership was transferred; the law ultimately protects that reliance when it is accompanied by open, continuous occupation for the statutory period. Cornell LII Wex, "Color of Title."
The hostile element as articulated in Nome 2000 v. Fagerstrom, 799 P.2d 304, 309 (Alaska 1990), captures this rationale precisely: the test is not moral wrongdoing but whether the occupant treated the land as an owner would. That framing converts adverse possession from a doctrine about punishment for bad behavior into a doctrine about the objective facts of ownership over time.
Understanding the doctrine's purpose also explains why legislatures in 2024 drew a sharp distinction between traditional adverse possession (which requires years of uninterrupted occupation and court adjudication) and the modern squatter problem (someone who moves into a vacant property opportunistically for days or weeks). The 2024 statutes in Florida, Georgia, Alabama, West Virginia, and Tennessee target the latter. They do not eliminate adverse possession claims built up over years; they create a fast track for removing recent unauthorized occupants before any adverse possession clock can start.
This page provides general legal information about squatters rights and adverse possession law in the United States. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship. Property law is governed by state statute and varies significantly by jurisdiction; the rules summarized here may not reflect the most current version of the law in your state or the specific facts of your situation. If you are a property owner dealing with an unlawful occupant, or if you believe you may have an adverse possession claim, consult a licensed real estate attorney in the state where the property is located. Information last verified May 2026.
Sources
The primary legal authorities cited in this article are listed below. Each authority was drawn from the research dossier verified May 27, 2026; the page template renders the full citation list with links.
Last updated: May 27, 2026.
Statutes cited reflect their in-force version as of May 27, 2026.
Sources and References
- Nome 2000 v. Fagerstrom, 799 P.2d 304 (Alaska 1990)(alaska-courts).gov
- Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 325(leginfo.legislature.ca.gov).gov
- Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 322(leginfo.legislature.ca.gov).gov
- N.Y. RPAPL § 501(nysenate.gov).gov
- N.Y. RPAPL § 511(nysenate.gov).gov
- N.Y. CPLR § 212(a)(nysenate.gov).gov
- N.Y. RPAPL § 521(nysenate.gov).gov
- Fla. Stat. § 95.18 (2024)(flsenate.gov).gov
- Fla. Stat. § 95.16(flsenate.gov).gov
- Fla. Stat. § 82.036 (2024)(flsenate.gov).gov
- Mont. Code Ann. § 70-19-411(leg.mt.gov).gov
- Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.026(statutes.capitol.texas.gov).gov
- Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.025(statutes.capitol.texas.gov).gov
- Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.024(statutes.capitol.texas.gov).gov
- Ga. HB 1017 (2024); O.C.G.A. § 16-7-21; O.C.G.A. tit. 44, ch. 11, art. 2(legis.ga.gov).gov
- 2024 Ala. Acts (HB 182)(alison.legislature.state.al.us).gov
- Alabama Governor's Office signing announcement (2024)(governor.alabama.gov).gov
- W. Va. Code §§ 55-3C-1, 55-3C-2 (2024)(code.wvlegislature.gov).gov
- Tenn. Pub. Ch. 1009 (2024); Tenn. General Assembly, HB 1259(wapp.capitol.tn.gov).gov
- Cornell LII Wex, Color of Title(law.cornell.edu)
- Cornell LII Wex, Ejectment(law.cornell.edu)
- California Courts Self-Help Center, Evictions(selfhelp.courts.ca.gov).gov
- Texas Law Help (approved by the Supreme Court of Texas), Evicting a Squatter(texaslawhelp.org)
- Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 11.070, 11.110, 11.150(leg.state.nv.us).gov
- La. Civ. Code arts. 3486, 3473(legis.la.gov).gov
- N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-30(njleg.state.nj.us).gov
- Wis. Stat. §§ 893.25, 893.26, 893.27(docs.legis.wisconsin.gov).gov
- Wis. Stat. § 893.27(docs.legis.wisconsin.gov).gov
- N.C. Sess. Law 2025-88 (2025)(ncleg.gov).gov
- Idaho Code § 6-310A (HB 321, 2025)(legislature.idaho.gov).gov
- 2024 La. Acts No. 466 (SB 466)(legis.la.gov).gov
- 2025 Md. Laws ch. 188 (SB 46)(mgaleg.maryland.gov).gov